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HOW RECOGNIZING THE ENDOGENEITY OF IDENTITY RENDERS THE
DISCOUNTING DEBATE LARGELY IRRELEVANT
Gregory Scott Crespi*
Abstract
Many social policies require the substantial commitment of
resources in order to provide benefits for future generations.
Conventional policy assessment by the usual willingness to pay valuation
criterion raises the issues of whether the future benefits of a policy
should first be discounted to a smaller present value before comparison
with its current costs in order to assess its merits, and if so then what
discount rate should be utilized for these calculations. There is, however,
less at stake in this debate than the partisans on either side commonly
realize. This is because of the failure of policy analysts to recognize that
all policies have pervasive and eventually universal and eternal “personaltering consequences” for genetic identities, the nature of which is
explained in this Article. These consequences, if measured by estimated
willingness to pay, will provide truly massive benefits for future
generations, but they are not amenable to meaningful quantification.
Therefore, these discounting issues do not arise with regard to these
kinds of consequences. Moreover, because the largest proportion by far
of the persons who will be impacted by a policy will be affected in a
person-altering manner, the resolution of these discounting issues with
regard to valuing the future impacts of a policy on existing persons is of
limited practical importance.

I. INTRODUCTION
Many social policies require the substantial commitment of resources in order
to provide benefits for future generations. Important examples include crucial
environmental policies, such as radioactive waste storage measures or fossil fuel
use restrictions undertaken to mitigate global warming trends.1 In assessing the
merits of such policies there is considerable controversy as to how to render
commensurate their adverse impacts upon existing persons with their beneficial
impacts upon the members of future generations, so that an overall assessment can
be made that properly reflects the rights and interests of all affected persons. Much
*

© 2010 Gregory Scott Crespi, Professor of Law, Dedman School of Law, Southern Methodist
University. J.D., Yale Law School; Ph.D., University of Iowa.
1
Measures now taken to isolate high-level radioactive wastes from the biological environment
impose substantial current costs, with the benefits accruing largely (though not exclusively) to the
members of future generations. Measures that may be taken in coming years to limit fossil fuel use so
as to mitigate global warming trends will similarly impose large current costs and will provide future
benefits that will largely (though likely not exclusively) accrue to members of future generations.
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of this controversy centers on the question of whether impacts on the members of
future generations that are valued in accordance with conventional cost-benefit
valuation criteria—that is, measured by the estimated willingness to pay of the
members of those future generations to benefit from or avoid those
consequences2—should first be “discounted” to a smaller present value before
aggregation with the comparably-valued current impacts upon existing persons, in
the same manner as is commonly done for discounted cash flow financial
valuations.3 Among advocates favoring the use of such discounting, there remains
considerable controversy regarding the question of the proper “discount rate” to
use for such calculations.4 I hereinafter refer to these two questions taken
together—the policy analysis methodology and discount rate—as the “discounting
issues.”
What I intend to do in this brief Article is demonstrate that there is much less
at stake in these debates than generally realized. The relevance of the resolution of
these discounting issues is far more restricted in scope than is recognized by the
partisans on either side of those debates.
Generally implicit, rather than explicit, in these discussions about the merits
of discounting future policy impacts, is an assumption that the fundamental genetic
identity of the members of future generations is exogenous with regard to and thus
unaffected by the policies that we pursue. In other words, the analysis of policies
that will have long-term impacts generally proceeds on the basis of the simplifying
assumption that the same future persons will be conceived and born whether or not
the policy at issue is implemented. However, this assumption is not merely
implausible but also demonstrably false. The fundamental genetic identities of the
members of future generations, after a relatively modest period of time, are in fact
endogenous to, or products of, the policies that we pursue. Any social policy, even
one with only minor and local initial impacts, will have exponentially proliferating
and eventually universal and eternal “person-altering consequences.”5 I discuss
these consequences below.
These person-altering consequences play havoc with attempts to assess longterm policy impacts upon future generations by the usual willingness to pay metric.
The willingness to pay of those future persons to enjoy or avoid policy impacts
2

See Gregory Scott Crespi, The Fatal Flaw of Cost-Benefit Analysis: The Problem of PersonAltering Consequences, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10703, 10704 (2008) [hereinafter Crespi, Cost-Benefit
Analysis].
3
See Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the
Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 943-48, 950-55 (1999). See also Joseph H.
Guth, Resolving the Paradoxes of Discounting in Environmental Decisions, 18 TRANSNAT’L. L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 95, 95-97 (2009).
4
Revesz, supra note 3, at 974-81; Guth, supra note 3, at 97.
5
I discuss the nature of these person-altering consequences in some detail in this article. See
also Crespi, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 2; Gregory Scott Crespi, Would it be Unethical to
Dump Radioactive Wastes in the Ocean? The Surprising Implications of the Person-Altering
Consequences of Policies, 35 ECOLOGY L. CURRENTS 43 (2008); Gregory Scott Crespi, What’s Wrong
with Dumping Radioactive Wastes in the Ocean? The Surprising Ethical and Policy Analysis
Implications of the Problem of Person-Altering Consequences, 37 ENVTL. L. REP. 10873 (2007)
[hereinafter Crespi, What’s Wrong].
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cannot be meaningfully calculated, given the person-altering nature of those
consequences, beyond a qualitative recognition that those persons will experience
truly massive benefits from any policies that we pursue. Without a reasonably
precise estimate of future benefits to work with, one will not even reach the issue
of whether such benefits should first be discounted to some present value before
they are aggregated with comparably valued current impacts.
This problem significantly reduces the importance of resolving these
discounting issues. The controversies over discounting issues remain relevant with
regard to assessment of that limited set of policy impacts that affect only those
persons born (or at least conceived) at the time that the policies are implemented
(or shortly thereafter). However, those issues do not arise with regard to assessing
policy impacts upon those many persons whose fundamental genetic identities
have been altered by those policies which, as discussed below, arguably includes
everyone conceived and born after a relatively modest interval of time has elapsed
after the policy’s initial implementation. Some new assessment methodology for
future policy impacts that can generate plausible quantitative estimates of their
value, and that does not rest upon estimating the willingness to pay of the members
of future generations, will first have to be developed to meaningfully evaluate
these long-term, person-altering consequences before these discounting issues will
arise and can be addressed in that context. Until then, however, the debate
regarding discounting issues actually has limited practical importance, because
generally the overwhelming proportion of the people affected by a policy will be
impacted in a person-altering manner.
In Part II of this essay I attempt to make clear the essential nature of these
person-altering consequences of policies. In Part III I demonstrate that attempts to
value those consequences in accordance with the estimated willingness to pay of
those persons cannot provide sufficiently precise quantitative estimates of the
magnitude of those benefits to distinguish among alternative policy options. In Part
IV I discuss the general irrelevance of discounting issues to policy valuation, given
these essentially unquantifiable person-altering consequences. In Part V I present a
brief conclusion.
II. THE NATURE OF PERSON-ALTERING CONSEQUENCES
The noted British philosopher Derek Parfit first articulated in 19766 a simple,
yet profound, insight which philosophers have since labeled “the Non-Identity
6
Derek Parfit, On Doing the Best for Our Children, ETHICS AND POPULATION 100, 100-115 (M.
Bayles, ed., 1976) [hereinafter Best for Our Children]. Gregory Kavka argues that Parfit’s insight
was also discovered independently at approximately the same time by Robert Adams and by Thomas
Schwartz. Gregory S. Kavka, The Paradox of Future Individuals, 11 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 93, 93-112
(1982) (citing Robert M. Adams, Existence, Self-Interest, and the Problem of Evil, 13 NOUS 53, 57
(1979)); Thomas Schwartz, Obligations to Posterity, in OBLIGATIONS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS 3, 313, (Richard Sikora & Brian Barry eds., 1978). Parfit further discusses his insights in Derek Parfit,
Future Generations, Further Problems, 11 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 113, 115-17 (1982) [hereinafter Future
Generations], DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 351-80 (1984) [hereinafter Reasons and
Persons], and Derek Parfit, Comments, 96 ETHICS 832 (1986) [hereinafter Comments].
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Problem,”7 and which I refer to in this essay as either the problem of “endogeneity
of identity” or the problem of “person-altering consequences.”8 This insight calls
into question whether we have any ethical obligations to distant future generations
that can be justified on the basis of conventional secular, consequentialist ethical
premises.9 Further, this insight also renders inadequate any analytical efforts to
assess policies that overlook those person-altering consequences. While this
problem has fostered substantial (though inconclusive) discussion among
philosophers and other scholars over the last three decades at an abstract, academic
7

Parfit later labeled this problem as the “Non-Identity Problem,” Reasons and Persons, supra
note 6, at 378, and it is generally so described by other academic philosophers. See, e.g., Doran
Smolkin, Towards a Rights-Based Solution to the Non-Identity Problem, 30 J. SOC. PHIL. 194 (1999);
David Wasserman, The Nonidentity Problem, Disability, and the Role Morality of Prospective
Parents, 116 ETHICS 132 (2005). The problem also is described by other scholars as the “Parfit
Paradox.” See, e.g., Kavka, supra note 6, at 95 (“[Parfit’s] argument poses a . . . Paradox of Future
Individuals”); Edith Brown Weiss, What Obligation Does Our Generation Owe to the Next? An
Approach to Global Environmental Responsibility: Our Rights and Obligations to Future
Generations for the Environment, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 198, 204 (1990) (referring to this insight as
“Derek Parfit’s famous paradox”); Lothar Gundling, What Obligation Does Our Generation Owe to
the Next? An Approach to Global Environmental Responsibility: Our Responsibility to Future
Generations, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 207, 210 (1990) (referring to this insight as “Parfit’s paradox”).
Those scholars who regard Parfit’s insight as posing a paradox commonly state the question that he
poses along the lines of, “How can we owe a duty to future persons if the very act of discharging that
duty wipes out the very individuals to whom we allegedly owe that duty?” See, e.g., Anthony
D’Amato, “What Obligation Does Our Generation Owe to the Next? An Approach to Global
Environmental Responsibility: Do We Owe a Duty to Future Generations to Preserve the Global
Environment?, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 190, 191 (1990). I prefer to pose the problem as a non-paradoxical,
though difficult, question of determining the ethical and policy valuation implications of policies that
have among their other long-term effects pervasive person-altering consequences—the elimination of
the existence of all yet-unborn future persons who would have been born absent the policy’s impacts,
and the birth instead of a different set of future persons.
8
In my opinion, Parfit’s own “Non-Identity Problem” label is more apt than the “Parfit
Paradox” label because the question is not really a paradox so much as it is a conceptual problem
regarding the existence of ethical obligations. However, Parfit’s label obscures somewhat the precise
nature of the problem for those who are not academic philosophers and are not familiar with the
problem and the body of scholarship that it has engendered. I therefore will use in this article the
more straightforward descriptive phrases “endogeneity of identity” or “person-altering
consequences.”
9
By the phrase “secular premises” I refer to ethical premises that are derived from reflections
on the human condition that are agnostic with regard to the existence of a supreme supernatural being
of ethical relevance. I will not address in this article the difficult question as to whether there is a
sufficient basis in one or more of the mainstream religious traditions for recognizing an ethical
obligation to the members of distant future generations. By the phrase “consequentialist premises” I
refer to the ethical premise that actions have ethical relevance only to the extent that they have
consequences for the rights or interests of specific persons, and that actions have no ethical relevance
in and of themselves apart from those consequences.
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level regarding its ethical significance,10 its dramatic practical implications for
policymakers have not yet been adequately addressed.11
Rather than attempt to detail or resolve the complex philosophical arguments
that have been offered regarding the problem of person-altering consequences,12 I
instead discuss the problem in a more condensed and straightforward manner that
10
See, e.g., Adams, supra note 6; Kavka, supra note 6; Schwartz, supra note 6; Smolkin, supra
note 7; James Woodward, The Non-Identity Problem, 96 ETHICS 804 (1986). See also Ori J. Herstein,
Historic Injustice and the Non-Identity Problem: The Limitations of the Subsequent-Wrong Solution
and Towards a New Solution, 27 LAW & PHIL. 505 (2008); Joanna Pasek, Environmental Policy and
‘The Identity Problem’ (CSERGE, Working Paper GEC 93-13, 2008) for more recent discussions.
11
But see Crespi, What’s Wrong, supra note 5, where I have attempted to contribute to a fuller
assessment. There is a legal literature of modest size and scope that addresses some of the
implications of the problem of person-altering consequences, but that literature fails to fully
incorporate the insights of the philosophers who have addressed the matter. See Aaron-Andrew P.
Bruhl, Justice Unconceived: How Posterity Has Rights, 14 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 393, 397 (2002)
(“[T]he topic of future generations’ rights has spawned a growing literature or, rather, at least two
separate literatures, one in law and the other in philosophy, with very little interaction between the
two.”). Most of the relevant legal literature focuses on the specific person-altering consequences
issues raised by assisted reproductive technologies; whether persons born with birth defects as a
result of such technologies but who would not have otherwise been born have standing to claim that
they were thereby injured by a “wrongful life” tort. See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen, Intentional
Diminishment, the Non-Identity Problem, and Legal Liability, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 347 (2008); Carter J.
Dillard, Rethinking the Procreative Right, 10 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1 (2007); Michael B.
Laudor, In Defense of Wrongful Life: Bringing Political Theory to the Defense of a Tort, 62
FORDHAM L. REV. 1675 (1994); Philip G. Peters, Jr., Harming Future Persons: Obligations to the
Children of Reproductive Technology, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375 (1999); Eric Rakowski, Who
Should Pay for Bad Genes?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1345 (2002); John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty
and Harm to Offspring in Assisted Reproduction, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 7 (2004); Kirsten Rabe
Smolensky, Creating Children with Disabilities: Parental Tort Liability for Preimplantation Genetic
Interventions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 299 (2008). There are only a few articles in the legal literature that
consider the significance of person-altering consequences in other contexts. See, e.g., Lukas H.
Meyer, The Palestinian Refugees and the Right of Return: Theoretical Perspectives: Historical
Injustice and the Right of Return, 5 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 305 (2004) (considering the significance of
person-altering consequences for the validity of the claims made by the descendants of displaced
Palestinian refugees for a right to return to their ancestral homeland); Amy J. Sepinwall,
Responsibility for Historical Injustices: Reconceiving the Case for Reparations, 22 J.L. & POL. 183
(2006) (considering the significance of person-altering consequences for the validity of the claims
made by the descendants of slaves for reparations payments). I am not aware of any prior attempts to
more broadly assess the significance of person-altering consequences for the conduct and relevance
of cost-benefit analysis in all contexts whatsoever, although Douglas Kysar has recently recognized
that those consequences do pose “deep conceptual challenges” to any analytical method such as costbenefit analysis “that is framed in terms of the rights, preferences, or interests of particular
individuals.” Douglas A. Kysar, It Might Have Been: Risk, Precaution and Opportunity Costs, 22 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 37 (2006).
Two other prominent law professors who have addressed the problem of person-altering
consequences at least tangentially in their work are Daniel Farber and Jeffrey Gaba. See Daniel A.
Farber, From Here to Eternity: Environmental Law and Future Generations, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV.
289, 302 n.69 (2003) (citing Derek Parfit); DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD (1999) at 151 n.38 (citing Derek Parfit);
Jeffrey M. Gaba, Environmental Ethics and Our Moral Relationship to Future Generations: Future
Rights and Present Virtue, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 249, 258 n.24 (1999).
12
See Crespi, What’s Wrong, supra note 5, for a more comprehensive referencing and review
of this literature.
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is intended to be helpful to lawyers, public policy analysts, and academics in other
fields who are not deeply versed in these technical philosophical debates, but who
nevertheless wish to better understand the nature of the problem of person-altering
consequences, and to contemplate its implications for practical policy making and
for the controversies surrounding discounting issues.
Parfit has been the primary instigator of and contributor to discussions of the
difficulties involved in grappling with the person-altering consequences of policies
through pieces he published between 1976 and 1986.13 The most significant of
these efforts were his original 1976 article14 and his more comprehensive 1984
book Reasons and Persons,15 but he has made other contributions to this debate.16
13
See, e.g., Best for Our Children, supra note 6; Future Generations, supra note 6; Reasons
and Persons, supra note 6; Comments, supra note 6.
14
See Best for Our Children, supra note 6. In this 1976 essay Parfit uses the hypothetical
situation of a woman deciding whether to postpone becoming pregnant until she recovers from an
illness that would result in any child conceived being born with a handicap to illustrate the personaltering consequences of a decision for persons who as a result will now not be born. Id. at 100-01.
Parfit notes that if the pregnancy is postponed and her child is later conceived after the illness is
cured, the child that would initially have been born will not now be born without the handicap, but
instead will never be born at all. Id. at 101. It is instead someone else with a different genetic
endowment that will be born without the handicap.
Whether a handicapped child is better off for not being born is an impossible question to
answer in abstract, general terms. It seems plausible that most if not all handicapped persons would
prefer their lives to nonexistence, particularly if the handicaps are of lesser severity. A mother who
decides to become pregnant while suffering such an illness and who therefore bears a handicapped
child cannot be criticized on the basis of the consequences for the child unless we assume that the
child would have preferred nonexistence to being born. Id. Such a sweeping and counterintuitive
assumption about the nature of the preferences of future persons is unwarranted. Similarly, it is far
more plausible that future people would prefer existence even with severe environmental constraints
to nonexistence.
To illustrate the effects of policies with person-altering consequences on people who will be
born as a result, Parfit, in this article, poses the hypothetical situation of a policy measure that would
have only positive effects upon existing persons, but that would also have very adverse effects for
future persons. Id. at 101-02. He notes that absent the implementation of the policy those particular
future persons would never have been born, and argues that they would prefer living subject to the
adverse effects of the policy at issue to the alternative of never having been born. Id.
15
Reasons and Persons, supra note 6. Parfit once again revisited the questions posed by personaltering consequences in this comprehensive 1984 book, now for the first time labeling the issue the
“Non-Identity Problem,” id. at 378 (“This problem arises because, in the different outcomes, different
people would exist. I therefore call this the Non-Identity Problem.”), and devoting an entire chapter
to its analysis, id. at 351-379, that drew heavily upon his earlier 1982 article, Future Generations,
supra note 6. After an extended analysis of numerous hypothetical situations Parfit concludes by
reasserting his position that a policy that has person-altering consequences will not be worse for those
persons thereby born as a result of the policy than would be their nonexistence should the policy not
have been implemented. Reasons and Persons, supra note 6, at 378.
Parfit takes in this book what he labels the “No Difference View”; that is, the claim that
although a policy will have person-altering consequences and therefore will not be worse for any
specific individual it still could be judged to be undesirable on moral grounds. Person-altering
consequences that make a policy worse for no one ultimately make no difference in a moral
evaluation of that policy. Id. at 366-71. He also concludes his chapter on the Non-Identity Problem by
reaffirming his earlier broad, aspirational claim first made in his 1982 article, Parfit, Future
Generations, supra note 6, at 169-72, that it may be possible to formulate a valuation approach that
appropriately addresses the problem of person-altering consequences, and which can justify moral
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Parfit’s seminal insight is that virtually any human action, however slight its
impacts, is likely to have at least minor effects on the timing of or other
circumstances surrounding some acts of sexual reproduction, leading to different
sperm-egg fertilizations than would otherwise have taken place, and consequently
condemnation even of policies that hurt no one. Persons and Reasons, supra note 6, at 377-79. He
generically labels this approach “Theory X,” id. at 378, and states that he will later in the book
attempt to formulate such a theory (“In what follows I will try to find Theory X.”). Id. at 379. He
predicts once again that this criterion will not be based upon an assessment of whether its
consequences are good or bad for affected future persons. Id. His final and more pessimistic
conclusion at the end of this book, however, is that he has again failed to formulate an approach that
adequately addresses the problem of moral evaluation in the context of person-altering consequences
without creating other difficulties that render the approach unacceptable, although he still
optimistically believes that it might yet be possible to do so. “Though I failed to discover X, I believe
that, if they tried, others could succeed.” Id. at 443.
Parfit notes several properties that his envisioned “Theory X” would have to satisfy to be an
adequate ethical approach: “Theory X must solve the Non-Identity Problem, avoid the Repugnant and
Absurd Conclusions, and solve the Mere Addition Paradox. I failed to find a theory that can meet
these four requirements.” Id. at 443. “Most of us would believe that the Repugnant and Absurd
Conclusions are what I have called them. Until we know how to avoid both conclusions, and how to
solve both the Non-Identity Problem and the Mere Addition Paradox, we will have beliefs that we
cannot justify, and that we know to be inconsistent.” Id. at 452.
16
See, e.g., Future Generations, supra note 6; Comments, supra note 6. Parfit later revisited the
questions posed by the person-altering consequences of policies that he first raised in his original
1976 article, Best for Our Children, supra note 6, in a later 1982 article, Future Generations, supra
note 6, which was written as a companion piece to a shorter article on the topic by Gregory Kavka,
Kavka, supra note 6, that Parfit’s 1976 essay had helped to inspire. Kavka, supra note 6, at 93. After
a long and detailed analysis of the problem, and of Kavka’s modified Kantian categorical imperativetype proposals for addressing it, Parfit once again concluded that policies with person-altering
consequences simply cannot be properly evaluated on the basis of whether the results of those
policies are better or worse for the rights or interests of future persons. Future Generations, supra
note 6, at 171-72. He again argued that “some new principle of beneficence” not yet identified that is
not based on those person-affecting considerations will be needed to judge the merits of such
policies. Id. He closed by stating that while it would be quite difficult to formulate such a new
principle, it would be hasty to conclude that it was impossible to do so, because “non-religious moral
philosophy is a very young subject.” Id. at 172.
Parfit’s article, Comments, supra note 6, was included in a 1986 ethics symposium issue
focusing on his 1984 book REASONS AND PERSONS, which also included contributions by Brian
Barry, Bart Gruzalski, Shelly Kagan, Arthur Kuflik, Bart Schultz, James Woodward and Susan Wolf.
In that article Parfit responded to each of the other symposium contributors’ comments on his 1984
book, see Reasons and Persons, supra note 6. In particular, Parfit responded in some detail to James
Woodward’s article, see James Woodward, The Non-Identity Problem, 96 ETHICS 804 (1986), that
specifically focused on the Non-Identity Problem. Comments, supra note 6, at 854-62. He there
reaffirmed his longstanding “No Difference View” conclusion, most fully articulated in Reasons and
Persons, supra note 6, at 366-71, that despite the fact that policies with adverse long-term
consequences will not make things worse for any particular future individuals because of those
policies’ person-altering consequences, there are still moral reasons for not choosing such policies,
Comments, supra note 6, at 854, and that these moral reasons are just as strong in spite of the fact that
no particular individuals are harmed by such policies. Id. at 855-56. Parfit once again conceded,
however, that he was unable to formulate the needed “new theory about beneficence” that would
justify this conclusion. Id. at 854.
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will over time lead to exponentially cascading consequences17 of a person-altering
nature as now genetically different individuals mature and reproduce and in other
ways influence the sexual behavior of a broader and broader circle of people.18
After probably no more than a few decades at the most19 this will lead for all
eternity to the entire human population being composed of individuals that each
have significantly different genetic endowments from those persons that would
have come into existence absent that initial policy action.20 The policy will thus
have changed the identity of all of those future persons; they will be different
people in the most fundamental genetic sense.
Genetic identity is thus an endogenous policy variable after a lapse of
probably no more than a few decades.21 Put another way, one dramatic
consequence of any policy measure, even one of limited and localized initial
impact, is that over the longer-term it will eliminate the coming into existence of
many and eventually all future persons who would otherwise have been conceived
and born. 22 It will result instead in the conception and birth of an increasingly and
17

These consequences will geometrically proliferate both in terms of the growing proportion of
conceptions that are impacted, and in terms of the growing number of genetic alterations that result
for a typical conception.
18
For fuller elaboration of this point see D’Amato, supra note 7, at 190-92.
19
While the initial impacts of a policy on the conception and birth of individuals may be quite
limited, once those first few genetically altered persons are born and begin to influence the behavior
of a wider and wider circle of people it is clear that the extent and magnitude of genetic alterations of
further conceptions will spread with exponential rapidity. It is, in my opinion, rather conservative to
estimate that it may take as long as twenty or thirty years for these person-altering consequences to
begin to impact all subsequent births. For major social policies with broader initial impacts the
transitional period involved until those consequences are universal may be quite a bit shorter than
this.
20
D’Amato, supra note 7, at 191. How rapidly the person-altering consequences of a policy
will proliferate, and how quickly the genetic divergence will be large enough to be of major
significance to the personal identities of the persons affected, will differ from policy to policy. The
identity of future persons will begin to be altered approximately nine months after the
implementation of a policy once persons conceived after the policy’s implementation begin to be
born (I am classifying those persons conceived before a policy is implemented but perhaps affected in
uterus by its consequences as “existing persons” with regard to that policy). One would expect that
given the obvious sensitivity of the forming of a particular sperm-egg fusion to a great multitude of
circumstances that the scope of the person-altering consequences of a policy would expand with
exponential rapidity once some genetically altered individuals are born, and that even relatively
isolated human communities would be impacted and then completely transformed within a few years
or at most a few decades. In addition, while the initial genetic alterations resulting may in some
instances be relatively minor in impact (eye color, “junk” DNA changes, etc.), arguably leaving
unaffected the “identity” of the persons genetically altered in such minor fashion, the number of
genetic alterations per person will also exponentially increase over time through the same cumulative
feedback process, rapidly leading to unarguable fundamental alterations in identity of all future
persons.
21
See supra note 19 (author’s comments). See also D’Amato, supra note 7, at 19.
22
There will be a post-policy “transitional period” starting approximately nine months after the
implementation of a policy during which some but not all of the individuals born will have their
fundamental genetic identities altered by the a policy’s consequences, before the person-altering
consequences are of universal scope. The length of such a transitional period, and the proportion of
individuals born with fundamentally altered identities at each point in time during this transitional
period, will presumably vary from policy to policy.
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eventually entirely genetically different group of people,23 with their genetic
endowments also increasingly diverging over time from that of the persons who
would otherwise have been born.24 The policy will thus fundamentally alter the
personal identities of all members of distant future generations; one vast group of
what might be referred to loosely as “potential persons”25 will now never be
conceived and born, and will be replaced by an entirely different group of
individuals. From the perspective of those persons who will now be born as a
consequence of the policy there could not be a more dramatic impact. These
person-altering consequences, as well as the other consequences of a policy, need
to be taken into account in any comprehensive assessment of its merits.
Parfit’s insight is correct, as a matter of scientific fact,26 and is an example of
what is commonly referred to as the “butterfly effect” of chaos theory27 where
small perturbations in initial conditions can lead to massive overall systemic
effects. Parfit was primarily concerned in his philosophical work on personaltering consequences with assessing their ethical implications, which he
understandably found to be quite disturbing.28 I have elsewhere addressed those
23

Id. (author’s comments).
Not only will the proportion of births that are policy-altered increase over time after the
implementation of the policy, but the cumulative magnitude of the genetic alterations for typical
individuals will also increase over time as the policy’s person-altering consequences become more
widely manifested and reinforce one another.
25
See D’Amato, supra note 7, at 191.
26
Id. at 192. This conclusion assumes a person’s identity is determined by their genetic
endowment and/or by the physical and cultural circumstances of their lives, rather than determined by
some kind of ethereal Cartesian ego or “soul” that is wholly independent of genetic characteristics or
physical or cultural influences. I assume for the purposes of this article that if the genetic endowment
of a person is significantly altered as a consequence of a policy this can be regarded as a change in
that person’s fundamental identity, whereas any consequence of a policy that does not significantly
alter a person’s genetic endowment, no matter how significant that consequence otherwise is to that
person’s life, does not change the fundamental identity of that person.
27
Id. at 192-94.
28
Parfit himself is obviously most uncomfortable with the unavoidable implication of his
insight that current policies that favor existing persons but that have adverse or even disastrous
impacts upon future persons would nevertheless be regarded as beneficial by those future persons
relative to their alternative of nonexistence if the policy is not pursued, and thus those policies cannot
be criticized on the usual person-affecting basis that they would injure particular people. “[T]he longterm effects of social policies, even if clearly disastrous–even if it clearly affects people for the
worse–won’t be worse for particular people. They are thus ignored by our principle. We might claim
that we should grant less weight to the further future . . . . But a ‘person-affecting’ principle gives to
the further future no weight. This seems indefensible.” Best for Our Children, supra note 6, at 102.
Parfit thus demonstrates he understands the serious problem posed by person-altering
consequences for any utilitarian criterion or related measure such as the Kaldor-Hicks wealthmaximization criterion that attempts to aggregate in some fashion the impacts of policies upon the
affected persons. “Such difficulties [posed by person-altering consequences] may seem to face only
utilitarians. This is not so. They face most of those who give any weight to a utilitarian principle.” Id.
at 100. He is unfortunately somewhat opaque in this brief 1976 essay regarding how this problem
should be resolved. He rejects the alternative of simply ignoring the exponentially cascading personaltering consequences that will generally occur when a policy is implemented, particularly given that
the total number of future persons that would be born will also likely be affected as well as their
individual identities. Id. at 103. He does state that the problem of person-altering consequences
24
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ethical issues in some detail.29 In this article, however, I address those ethical
implications only tangentially and focus instead upon the implications of personaltering consequences for the debate concerning the discounting of future policy
impacts.
III. ATTEMPTING TO VALUE PERSON-ALTERING CONSEQUENCES
IN ACCORDANCE WITH WILLINGNESS TO PAY
For any policy measure undertaken there will be three groups of persons who
are differently situated with regards to that policy. First, there are the persons who
are already in existence at the time that the policy is initially implemented,
including those persons who have been conceived but not yet born as of that
moment. Those persons’ fundamental genetic identities have been established prior
to the implementation of the policy and will not be altered by that policy. Second,
there are those future persons who will be conceived after the policy’s
implementation and whose genetic identity will be impacted to some significant
extent30 by the spreading indirect effects of that policy on acts of conception.
Those are the persons for whom that policy will have “person-altering
consequences,” and whom I will hereinafter refer to as “future persons” with
regard to the policy at issue. Third, there is the (rapidly diminishing in size over
time) group of persons who are conceived and born during the “transitional period”
after the policy has been implemented but before its person-altering consequences
have spread widely enough to impact those particular persons’ genetic identities.31
implies that the long-term consequences of policies should not be determined by their impacts upon
the rights and interests of the affected future persons, id. at 102, but he does not offer an alternative
valuation method.
29
See generally Crespi, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 2.
30
There may be some persons, particularly in the immediate aftermath of a policy’s
implementation, whose conceptions are genetically altered by the consequences of a policy only to
the extent that there is some alteration in their “junk” DNA or in other DNA that does not
significantly affect their personal identity. I believe that these persons are best classified as “existing
persons” rather than “future persons” under my classification framework. Over time, the personaltering consequences will not only proliferate but also become more substantial, on average, so that
the number of such insignificant genetic alterations will rapidly diminish towards zero.
31
Including those persons whose genetic identities are altered, but only in ways that are not
significant with regard to those person’s fundamental personal identities. Id. One might also define a
fourth group of “beings” if one could call them that, who would consist of the vast horde of now
never to be conceived persons who would have been conceived and born had we taken some course
of action other than the policy that was pursued, but who now as a consequence of that policy will
never come into existence. It is obvious that the hypothetical preferences of this fourth group of
untold trillions of wholly imaginary beings should not be given any weight in an analysis of the
merits of the policy at issue. With their very existence at stake, each of these beings would likely
regard any specific policy—other than the single policy that would result in their coming into
existence—as imposing immense costs upon them, resulting in a very large if not infinite aggregate
cost measure for any specific policy whatsoever that would dominate any measure of benefits that is
utilized. This absurd result of massive rejection of any course of action whatsoever (including the
null option of taking no action, which would also of course preclude the conception of many beings)
indicates that it would be a category mistake to accord standing to potential but now never to be
conceived beings in an analysis of the consequences of a policy that necessarily precludes the
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The discounting issues that are widely debated will still arise with regard to
the first and third groups of persons described above, whom I will hereinafter
describe collectively as “existing persons” with regard to the policy measure at
issue. It makes sense to attempt to estimate in the conventional fashion the
willingness to pay of those existing persons to enjoy or to avoid policy
consequences, and then to discuss whether future policy impacts upon those
existing persons should be discounted in some fashion before their being
aggregated with the more immediate impacts upon those same persons in assessing
the merits of a policy. The debates taking place regarding the discounting issues
are still meaningful in the context of future policy impacts upon existing persons.
But what about this second group of future persons who will be conceived and
born post-policy implementation, and whose genetic identities will be significantly
altered by the person-altering consequences of the policy? For these future persons
the policy’s implementation is a necessary condition of their existence, because
absent the policy they would never have been conceived and born. In light of this
fact, what would be their likely willingness to pay for the policy consequences set
in motion before their conception?
The answer to this question appears to me to be rather obvious. One would
expect that at least the overwhelming majority (if not all) of these future persons
who owe their existence to the implementation of a policy would, if given the
opportunity to value its consequences, assign high offer prices32 for those effects,
even were that policy to have some adverse or even catastrophic consequences for
their well-being, since the alternative scenario they would face would be
nonexistence. Consequently, any policy with person-altering consequences,
virtually no matter how broadly catastrophic its long-term impacts for future
persons, would under the estimated willingness to pay valuation approach almost
certainly result in truly massive aggregate benefits for those untold trillions of
future persons who will come into existence over the rest of eternity, for the reason
that all of those future persons whose hypothetical preferences are being
considered would owe their existence to the implementation of that policy.
The severe valuation problem posed by person-altering consequences is thus
squarely presented. For those untold trillions of future persons whose fundamental
genetic identity will be significantly affected by those consequences of a policy,
the policy is a necessary condition of their existence. Its impacts will thus be
valued very highly by those persons as compared to their actual alternative of
nonexistence. The current conventional practice of valuing the consequences of a
existence of those beings. The hypothetical preferences of all of those beings who have the potential
to come into existence under one policy alternative or another, but whose existence would be
precluded by the specific policy measure under consideration, should be ignored in assessing that
policy’s effects.
32
And likely infinite asking prices if this is the willingness to pay measure utilized. Whether
offer prices or instead asking prices should be used to measure costs and benefits is a controversial
question that I have elsewhere explored at length. See generally Gregory Scott Crespi, Valuation in
Cost-Benefit Analysis: Choosing Between Offer and Asking Prices as the Appropriate Measure of
Willingness to Pay, 39 J. MAR. L. REV. 429 (2006) [hereinafter Crespi, Offer and Asking Price], and
plausible arguments can be made for the use of offer price measures of benefits. Id. at 464-65.
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policy for future persons as compared to the hypothetical baseline scenario of a
world in which those same persons would exist, but without experiencing the
policy’s impacts, makes no sense because such a scenario could not possibly occur.
Willingness to pay-based assessments of benefits for future persons derived in
such a fashion—based on the valuation reference point of an unattainable
alternative—are completely arbitrary and irrelevant to the actual policy choices at
hand.
Moreover, valuations so derived are not only arbitrary and irrelevant but are
also likely biased downwards, in some instances dramatically so. This is because
for some policies, many future persons may strongly prefer this posited (though
unattainable) scenario in which they are presumed to exist, though without
experiencing the impacts of the policy. Making this comparison, those future
persons would then assign costs rather than large benefits to the policy’s
consequences, leading in the aggregate to a massive undervaluation of the future
effects of the policy on those persons, as compared to its valuation if those future
persons were asked to assess it as against their actual alternative of nonexistence.
The current conventional valuation approach thus may give far too much weight to
the consequences of a policy for existing persons, relative to its actual massively
beneficial impacts on future persons.
“Truly massive” is unfortunately about as precise a phrase as one can use with
regard to the estimated aggregate willingness to pay-based value of these personaltering consequences to future persons, if properly calculated with regard to the
actual alternative of their nonexistence. These person-altering consequences will
persist and increase in magnitude for all eternity, and it is of course not knowable
in advance how many future persons from each era will exist or would be offering
their valuations in such a hypothetical referendum, let alone what the wealth
endowment and precise preference structure of each of these future persons that
would constrain the magnitude of their offer prices would be. It is simply not
possible to meaningfully quantify the aggregate size of those benefits for future
persons, nor ascertain the relative distribution of the costs and benefits of a policy
between existing persons and future persons. Since no meaningful numbers can be
obtained for valuing these person-altering policy consequences under the usual
willingness to pay approach, the discounting issues that quantitative estimates
obtained in that fashion would then raise simply do not arise for those personaltering consequences.
Let me offer a salient hypothetical to try to make this abstract analysis more
concrete as to its practical implications for the significance of the discounting
issues. Consider, for example, a radically present-oriented proposal to put all of
our high-level radioactive wastes into ordinary steel barrels that will not provide
effective long-term containment beyond a century or two, and then dump them all
overboard into the Pacific Ocean.33 This policy would free most of the billions of
dollars of resources now devoted each year to radioactive waste storage efforts to
33
This particular hypothetical is analyzed in some detail in my earlier articles on the subject.
See Crespi, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 2, at 10710-11; Crespi, What’s Wrong, supra note 5, at
10873, 10881.
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be diverted to other pressing social needs. While those future persons born a
century or more from now and thereafter may well suffer significant adverse
environmental consequences from such an action, the billions of dollars per year of
resource reallocations enabled by such a policy would have immediate and
exponentially cascading person-altering consequences that would be universal in
scope well before those barrels began to leak their poisons.
Existing persons would likely benefit substantially in the aggregate from this
policy, since they could avail themselves of the resources freed for other uses, and
would all be long dead before the barrels began leaking their poisons.34 The future
persons who will be conceived and born as a person-altering consequence of that
ocean waste dumping policy would owe their very existence to the policy. If these
future persons were asked for their opinions about the policy, if they are at all like
existing persons in their psychological make-up they would overwhelmingly (if
not unanimously) prefer coming into existence over non-existence, even if their
lives involved grappling with a serious radioactive waste problem. They would of
course much prefer existence without the radioactive waste problem, were that an
option, but the central insight of the problem of person-altering consequences is
that this problem-free scenario is not possible. The only choice that those future
persons would be properly hypothetically presented with is the bundled Hobson’s
Choice of life with the radioactive waste problem or nonexistence. If they are at all
like existing persons they would assign large benefits to the policy. But it would of
course be impossible as a practical matter to assign a meaningful number to the
aggregate willingness to pay of all of those persons who will exist through the rest
of eternity for the consequence of their coming into existence. Therefore there will
be no plausible quantitative benefit numbers generated that would raise the
discounting issues with regard to the consequences of this ocean waste dumping
policy for future persons.
In my opinion, the failure of public policy analysts to incorporate personaltering consequences into their analyses has been due primarily to their
overlooking those consequences rather than their recognizing those consequences
and choosing to ignore them under one rationale or another.35 Apparently, the
public policy analysis community is unfamiliar with the work of Derek Parfit and
other philosophers who have wrestled with understanding and giving proper
weight to these kinds of consequences.
34

Of course, to the extent that some existing persons are uncomfortable with the possibility of
leaving distant future generations with a significant ocean radioactive pollution problem, that may
reduce or even eliminate the perceived benefits those persons will obtain from the current resource
reallocations. Whether or not those persons’ concern for the welfare of future generations is grounded
in an accurate understanding of the consequences of our current choices, it still would reflect a
preference on their part that merits inclusion in a non-paternalistic, willingness to pay-based
valuation of the current consequences of that policy.
35
For examples of ignoring person-altering consequences in otherwise comprehensive
discussions of cost-benefit analysis and discounting issues see Revesz, supra note 3; John D.
Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 423-30
(2008); Guth, supra note 3.
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One could argue that the conventional use for policy valuation of a
demonstrably unattainable hypothetical baseline reference scenario that assumes
the same persons will exist whether or not a policy is implemented, and thus
ignores person-altering consequences, could be justified on the basis of parallels
drawn between this endogeneity of identity situation and the lesser problem
presented for analysis by endogenous preferences.36 One might attempt to
characterize the endogeneity of identity problem presented by person-altering
consequences as simply being an extreme extension of the endogenous preferences
situation, different only in magnitude and not in its essential character. One might
then seek guidance for evaluating policies with person-altering consequences from
the ideas that have been proposed for addressing the lesser difficulties posed by
endogenous preferences.37
This argument, however, proves unconvincing. In the paradigmatic
endogenous preferences situation a group of persons whose circumstances have
been impacted by a policy have also had their preference structures altered by the
policy, although their fundamental genetic identities are unchanged. The question
there posed is whether those persons’ pre-policy implementation preferences, or
instead their different post-policy implementation preferences, should be utilized to
generate their willingness to pay-based cost and benefit assessments of the policy’s
impacts, as compared to the reference point of the policy not being implemented
and those persons’ initial circumstances and preference structures both remaining
unchanged.38 It is facially plausible at first consideration that the endogeneity of
identity problem might be viewed in some regards as simply an extreme extension
of the endogenous preferences problem, and thus amenable to some of the same
valuation adjustments discussed above.
However, this analogy between the endogenous preferences and endogeneity
of identity situations is rather superficial and breaks down under closer inspection.
In the endogenous preference situation only existing persons are involved, and a
choice need only be made as to which of the two (or more) preference structures
that are held by those persons at different points in time is a more appropriate basis
for valuation of policy effects. In the endogeneity of identity situation, in sharp
contrast, the future persons involved do not exist prior to the implementation of the
policy, and have only one preference structure, their post-policy implementation
preferences that very strongly favor the policy at issue. The use of the conventional
baseline scenario assumption therefore does not merely substitute an earlier and
different structure of preferences held by those same persons for use in obtaining
those persons’ valuation of the policy. That assumption in this instance instead
substitutes as the reference point for comparison a hypothetical factual
circumstance—those persons’ existence but without the policy’s consequences—
that cannot possibly occur and bears no relationship to those persons’ preferences,
earlier or later, “true” or otherwise. The arguments made that might justify use of
36
See Gregory Scott Crespi, Incorporating Endogenous Preferences in Cost-Benefit Analysis,
17 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 157 (2009).
37
Id. at 173-87.
38
Id. at 166.

2010]

DISCOUNTING DEBATE

89

pre-policy implementation preferences under some circumstances to value a policy
in the endogenous preferences context39 obviously do not justify the use of a
demonstrably false “the same persons will exist either way” standard of
comparison in the endogeneity of identity context.
Another possible argument that might be offered in favor of ignoring personaltering consequences in policy assessment is based on the idea that while those
future persons who would be conceived and born as a result of any particular
policy choice would ascribe very large benefits to that policy since it provides the
necessary conditions for their existence, there is no feasible way to quantify and
compare these benefits that would result for each of the different groups of future
persons that would be conceived and born under each of our many possible policy
options. Given this fact, perhaps it makes sense to simply ignore the massive
beneficial impacts of each policy under consideration upon the particular group of
future persons that it brings into being and focus only upon the impacts upon
existing persons.40 Those massive but practically quantifiable benefits to those
future persons who are born under each of the different possible policy options
might thus be regarded as “cancelling out” across the those policy options and, in a
sense, justifying ignoring them in policy analysis.41
This approach of nominally recognizing the existence of person-altering
consequences and then explicitly ignoring them in the valuation calculations under
a cancelling out theory is, however, also problematic. Conventional cost-benefit
analyses often overlook certain diffuse impacts that the analyst cannot
meaningfully reduce to quantitative terms. For example, the diffuse psychological
impacts on persons due to their empathetic recognition of benefits conferred or
costs imposed on other persons are difficult or impossible to measure with
sufficient precision to meaningfully combine with more tangible policy impacts,
and are commonly ignored. In many instances this practice of limiting the scope of
the analysis to feasibly quantifiable impacts can be justified as a reasonable and
39

See id. at 173-76 (discussing the views of Cass Sunstein in this regard).
Crespi, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 2, at 10713-14.
41
See generally Gaba, supra note 11 (arguing that the very many different groups of persons
whose conception and birth would be precluded by any policy that is chosen from the immense set of
possible alternatives should perhaps have their interests ignored in an analysis on the basis that they
“cancelled out” in the analysis). While Gaba is only referring to cancelling out the interests of those
groups of persons whose birth is precluded by the policy that is chosen, this cancelling out approach
might be extended to also ignore in an analysis the interests of those future persons who would be
born as a result of the policy under consideration. Such a broader cancelling out approach with regard
to both those future persons who will be born as a result of a policy and those potential future persons
whose births are precluded by the policy has been suggested by Eric Posner:
40

For ordinary regulations such as environmental regulation, there will be little
reason to think there is a morally significant difference between producing the first group
of people [those born if the policy is not implemented] and producing the second group
of people [those born if the policy is implemented]. Therefore I think the two would
cancel out.
Eric Posner, personal correspondence with the author (February 5, 2008) (on file with the
author).
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necessary analytical simplification on the basis that those overlooked and
practically immeasurable impacts are relatively small in magnitude relative to the
more easily measured impacts, and/or that they tend to offset one another in the
aggregate, so that the ultimate conclusions of the analysis are not significantly
affected by their omission.
Person-altering consequences, however, are different in several ways. First,
they are huge in magnitude relative to the measurable impacts upon existing
persons, and cannot be overlooked without dramatically affecting the results of the
analysis. Second, they do not offset one another across the affected population;
virtually all future persons would likely ascribe very large benefits to a policy that
is a necessary condition of their existence. The conventional arguments offered for
selectively overlooking certain difficult to quantify policy impacts in a cost-benefit
analysis thus do not support doing so when person-altering consequences are
involved. A second shortcoming is that assigning zero value to the impacts upon
future persons may under some circumstances yield results that are even less
accurate than are the arbitrary conclusions reached under the conventional
approach, and may again lead to an even more pronounced bias towards radically
present-oriented policies.
In brief summary, person-altering consequences are ubiquitous and are of
great magnitude, and can no longer be simply ignored in policy valuation. But
attempting to value those person-altering consequences in the usual willingness to
pay-based manner leads to the blanket result that all policy options whatsoever will
generate truly massive benefits to future persons, but those benefits are not
measurable with sufficient precision to allow the alternative policy options to be
meaningfully compared and ranked in that regard. It is necessary for us to develop
new assessment methodologies that can provide plausible quantitative assessments
of future policy impacts, while still recognizing the pervasiveness and
overwhelming significance of person-altering consequences.
IV. DISCOUNTING PERSON-ALTERING CONSEQUENCES
As I have shown above, attempts to value the person-altering consequences of
policies by the usual willingness to pay metric, as compared to the actual
alternative of nonexistence for those future persons, lead inevitably to the
conclusion that any policy will result in truly massive but practically
unquantifiable benefits to future generations. Given this insurmountable
quantification difficulty, is there any plausible rationale remaining for discounting
those benefits which would then raise the discounting issues regarding whether and
how this should be done?
At first consideration the answer to this question appears to be negative. The
advocates of discounting future benefits typically justify this practice on the basis
of either the present-oriented time preferences of people, or on the basis of the
positive rates of return that are possible on capital investments.42 But application of
42

Guth, supra note 3, at 97-104.
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the relatively modest discount rates that can be justified in these ways43 to the truly
massive future benefits that result from any policy that has person-altering
consequences, given that those consequences are likely to become universal within
decades rather than centuries, would lead to those discounted future benefits
completely dominating the costs imposed on existing persons by the policy in
question no matter how large those costs may be. While discount rates of such
magnitude might suffice to reduce to relative insignificance even very large
benefits that occurred a century or two or more in the future,44 they would not
suffice to prevent the person-altering consequences for the many millions of future
people whose genetic identities are likely to be affected within a few years (or at
most a few decades) after a policy’s implementation, given the great sensitivity of
particular sperm-egg unions to even very minor changes in the circumstances of an
act of sexual intercourse, from completely dominating the calculations.45 The
application of discount rates in the normally-utilized range would thus result in a
blanket endorsement of all policies whatsoever on account of their person-altering
consequences, with no meaningful basis provided for discriminating among them.
Such a result would be unhelpful for making policy decisions.
One possible application of the discounting methodology in the personaltering consequences context, however, is worth at least brief consideration. One
might first value the impacts of a policy on the members of distant future
generations for whom it is a necessary condition of their existence by their
estimated offer prices, rather than by their estimated asking prices,46 so as to
initially generate a finite (although still very large) aggregate benefit measure,
rather than an analytically intractable infinite benefit measure, and then discount
those future benefits at a very high discount rate; high enough so that they will
have an aggregate present value of essentially zero. Under this approach the
43

The highest annual discount rate that has been widely used in recent years by analysts was
the 10% discount rate recommended by the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) for federal
agency purposes. Revesz, supra note 3, at 950. The OMB now recommends use of lower 7% or 3%
annual discount rates. Guth, supra note 3, at 98-99. The 7% rate is justified by OMB as reflecting the
average before-tax return to private capital in the US, and the 3% rate is justified as the historical real
rate of return on long-term government debt which reflects social time preferences. Id. The US
Environmental Protection Agency now similarly recommends use of 7% and 3% annual discount
rates. Id. at 99. See also Daniel H. Cole, Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis and Collective Action 6
(SSRN Working Paper, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1369338, (referring to a range of
studies recommending discount rates that range from near zero to 20% annual rates, and to a survey
of two thousand economists that in the aggregate recommended using annual discount rates of 4% for
near-term effects, diminishing to 1% for long-term effects occurring after seventy five years).
44
For example, benefits that occurred one hundred years in the future would by the use of a
10% annual discount rate be reduced by a factor of approximately 13,740, and benefits occurring two
hundred years in the future would be reduced by a factor of approximately 1,888,000!
45
For example, benefits that occurred five years in the future would by the use of even a 10%
annual discount rate only be discounted by a factor of approximately 1.6. Even those benefits that did
not occur for thirty years, by which time the person-altering consequences of almost any policy are
likely to be universal, would only be discounted by a factor of approximately 17.5, leaving them
likely still several orders of magnitude greater than the policy’s impacts upon existing persons and
thus dominating any recommendations.
46
Supra note 32 (author’s comments). See also Graham, supra note 35, at 423-30.
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massive benefits of a policy for the members of distant future generations would
then be reduced to insignificance by this discounting and thus not overwhelm the
effects of the policy on existing persons, which would become essentially the sole
consideration in reaching a conclusion.
Let me consider this discounting approach in more detail. First, the use of
offer price rather than asking price measures of impacts is plausible. Offer prices
are now conventionally used in cost-benefit analyses, rather than asking prices, to
measure both the costs and benefits of the policy under consideration.47 While
some observers regard this choice of valuation measures as arbitrary and imposing
a sometimes severe downward bias on the numbers thereby obtained,48 a more indepth analysis of the question suggests that the use of offer prices rather than
asking prices can perhaps be adequately justified, at least for benefit measures,
although the question of how the cost impacts of a policy are most appropriately
measured is a much more difficult question whose proper resolution is still
uncertain.49
The use of a very high discount rate to minimize the policy benefits for future
persons is, however, far more problematic. Annual discount rates in the high triple
digits would probably be necessary to reduce those nearer-term truly massive
future benefits to insignificance relative to current policy impacts.50 High tripledigit annual discount rates, however, cannot be grounded on any plausible theory
of social time preferences or rates of return on capital investment. The use of this
approach to discount the magnitude of person-altering consequences is a contrived
means of nominally addressing person-altering consequences in a willingness to
pay-based valuation framework, while in substance ignoring those consequences
through manipulation of the mathematics of discounting to avoid the paralyzing
computational difficulties. Moreover, this approach is perhaps even less adequate
than the current conventional approach in handling the problem of person-altering
consequences, if that is possible to imagine.
The current conventional approach, as discussed above, rather than attempting
to value person-altering consequences substitutes valuation of a policy’s effects
relative to a demonstrably unattainable baseline scenario that ignores those
consequences. The suggested offer prices/very high discount rate alternative, in
47

Crespi, Offer and Asking Price, supra note 32, at 436; see also Graham, supra note 35, at

427-30.
48

See generally Crespi, Offer and Asking Price, supra note 32, at 440-62.
The issue of whether offer prices or instead asking prices are the most appropriate way to
measure costs and benefits is exhaustively addressed in Crespi, Offer and Asking Price, supra note
32, and in Russell Korobkin, Note, Policymaking and the Offer/Asking Problem Price Gap: Towards
a Theory of Efficient Entitlement Allocation, 46 STAN. L. REV. 663 (1994).
50
For example, use of even a 100% annual discount rate would discount benefits that occurred
five years in the future by a factor of only thirty two, and tenth-year benefits by a factor of only
1,024, which would still result in the truly massive benefits resulting from person-altering
consequences dominating the analysis. However, an annual discount rate of, say, 700%, would lead
to the discounting of such fifth-year benefits by a factor of 16,807, and tenth-year or later benefits by
a factor of 282 billion or more, which might suffice to reduce even the truly massive (though finite)
offer-price based benefits of person-altering consequences to an aggregate level that is insignificant
relative to the policy’s impacts on existing persons.
49
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contrast, candidly recognizes the existence of person-altering consequences as a
formal matter but then proceeds to value them at essentially zero through the high
discount rate ploy. This zero measure of impacts upon future persons could in
some instances be even less accurate than the arbitrary measure that is obtained
through the conventional approach, under which it is quite possible to obtain a
positive rather than zero aggregate valuation of a policy’s impacts on future
persons relative to the hypothetical baseline scenario. Thus, the offer prices/very
high discount rate alternative might lead, in some cases, to an even more
pronounced bias towards radically present-oriented policies, such as my ocean
waste dumping hypothetical, than that of the current approach.
Despite these shortcomings, one could argue that an approach that at least in
principle recognizes the existence and great magnitude of person-altering
consequences, even though it then mathematically manipulates them out of the
analysis through the use of a very high discount rate, is at least a small step in the
right direction. Those important consequences are now not completely ignored at
the outset, and the core willingness to pay-based valuation framework has
nominally been retained. However, this approach ultimately avoids confronting in
a meaningful fashion the difficult valuation question presented by person-altering
consequences, and moreover may suffer from an even stronger bias in favor of
radically present-oriented policies than does the conventional approach. I conclude
that this offer prices/very high discount rate alternative approach is an inadequate
means of modifying policy analysis to incorporate person-altering consequences.
There simply is no meaningful way to apply discounting to future policy
consequences measured in accordance with estimated willingness to pay when
those consequences are of a person-altering nature that will generate truly massive
benefits.
V. CONCLUSION
Many significant social policies impose current costs in order to provide longterm benefits. There is considerable controversy regarding whether in assessing the
merits of such policies through the conventional willingness to pay framework
these future benefits should first be discounted to a smaller present value before
being aggregated with current impacts, and if so, then what is the appropriate
discount rate to utilize for such calculations.
There is in fact less at stake in the resolution of these discounting issues than
is commonly recognized. These questions are still relevant with regard to a
policy’s future impacts upon those persons existing at the time of a policy’s initial
implementation. But the future impacts of policies are largely of a person-altering
character in that they will significantly alter the fundamental genetic identities of
the members of future generations. If such person-altering consequences are
valued in accordance with the estimated willingness to pay of the affected future
persons the result reached for any policy whatsoever will be truly massive
aggregate benefits that cannot be quantified with any real precision. Since no
plausible quantitative estimates of the value of future policy consequences can be
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generated, there is no need to address the discounting issues with regard to those
consequences. Moreover, the largest proportion by far of the persons who will be
impacted by a policy over time are future persons who will be impacted in a
person-altering fashion. Therefore the resolution of the discounting issues will
have only a minor impact on valuations, if those valuations are properly done so as
to reflect person-altering consequences, and is thus not nearly as significant for
policy assessment as is commonly believed.
If a new policy assessment methodology is developed that allows for
meaningful quantitative estimates of future impacts, while still recognizing the
pervasiveness and significance of person-altering consequences, the discounting
issues would then have to be addressed with regard to those estimates. Until then,
however, the debate regarding these issues is of very limited practical importance.

